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Abstract 
Asian countries made remarkable economic progress. They have transformed 
themselves from technologically backwards and poor, to modern and affluent 
economies. Impressive advances in social development accompanied this rapid 
growth. Also contrary to earlier conventional wisdom, this rapid growth was 
achieved without increases in income inequality. This paper will try to find 
explanations for the Asian miracle to draw some lessons to other developing 
countries. The Key Messages of this paper are that reform must begin with the 
government, reforms are not one- time actions, maintaining consistency is a 
crucial factor for success, introducing new systems for reform doesn’t matter 
much; what matters is how to implement them and how to make them deep- 
rooted, reformers should be well aware of true nature of reform process, and 
reforming culture is more important and takes more time than reforming 
system. 




























The spectacular growth of Asian countries1 over the past four decades has amazed 
economics profession and has evoked a torrent of books and articles attempting to 
explain the phenomenon. The entire Asian experience is of great interest to all those 
interested in economic development, both because understanding what did happen 
will enable the design of policies to encourage further growth, and because it is 
natural to attempt to glean whatever lessons emerge from this experience for 
application to other countries. 
 
These countries have transformed themselves from technologically backwards and 
poor, to modern and affluent economies, they experienced sustained economic growth 
at rates that exceeded those earlier thought achievable. Impressive advances in social 
development accompanied the rapid growth of the Asian economies: poverty, infant 
mortality, and adult illiteracy all declined significantly, while life expectancy at birth 
rose considerably. Also contrary to earlier conventional wisdom, rapid economic 
growth was achieved without increases in income inequality. On these grounds the 
question of “how they did it?” obviously is of enormous scientific and policy 
importance. 
 
Although no uniform model of development was applied throughout Asia, central to 
the performance of successful Asian economies was an emphasis on stability- 
oriented macroeconomic policies, among the aims of which were relatively low 
inflation and the avoidance of overvalued exchange rates; high rates of physical and 
human capital accumulation; and export oriented production, which among other 
things, encouraged the adoption of advanced technology. More differentiated across 
countries, and more controversial in their effects, were industrial policies and 
government intervention.  
 
The reason why I chose this title is that we know that the Asian economies have been 
successful; consequently these economies are widely studied since success has a 
thousand fathers. On the other hand, since economists find unsuccessful economies 
much less attractive to study, they rarely look at economies of this type and that’s why 
failure is an orphan. Economic policies in the successful Asian economies are far 
from homogenous which gives hope to other developing countries because there is no 
unique recipe for success. The more one examines the policies individual Asian 
economies have pursued, the more evident it becomes how different these policies 
have been.  
 
2. On Explaining the Asian Miracle 
 
We should point out that in searching for these common traits across successful Asian 
economies, we are not suggesting that there has been only one path to sustained 
development, which gives great hope to other developing countries that differ widely 
                                                 
1 This paper will focus on the following East Asian and Southeast Asian countries: Hong Kong, 




in their resource endowments, human capital accumulation, population densities and 
structures, and political systems. 
 
Hong Kong and Singapore are small, urban, very open economies that have relied 
heavily on commerce and a free port service as the foundation for growth. They have 
few natural resources, but have well- educated workforces. Their basic strategy was to 
rely on free and open markets, backed by competent civil service and a strong legal 
system. Both governments consistently welcomed and encouraged foreign direct 
investment.  
 
South Korea was a relatively small economy with few natural resources but with well-
educated workforce. Agricultural growth, spurred in part by land reform and green 
revolution technologies, contributed significantly to aggregate growth in the early 
stages of the take-off period. This country initially followed a strategy of import 
substitution for consumer goods. It kept the level of protection low and the duration of 
protection relatively brief, and did not extend protection to capital goods sectors. This 
country switched course to aggressively promote export production, with 
governments at times intervening forcefully in the market with subsidies, special lines 
of credit, and controls on international capital flows. It discouraged foreign direct 
investment; it also relied on a small number of large conglomerates to meet its export 
goals. 
 
Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand are larger countries with abundant natural 
resources and a smaller human capital base. As with South Korea, agriculture has 
played a critical role in reducing poverty and contributing to aggregate economic 
growth. These countries adopted much more protectionist industrial policies, with 
more extensive and longer lasting import substitution policies. Many sectors have 
remained under the control of state enterprises or heavily protected from competition 
for long periods of time, even when they have performed poorly. Nevertheless, each 
of these countries established mechanisms through which exporters could avoid the 
high costs associated with protection and become competitive on international 
markets. Once again, there are important differences: Malaysia welcomed foreign 
direct investment more than the other two countries, and concentrated more on 
exports of consumer electronics rather than textiles and apparel. 
 
These differences suggest that the road to sustained growth and development has 
differed in important ways across these countries, with each country facing different 
obstacles, complications, and opportunities. Rodrick (1994), remarks that the East 
Asian model encompasses highly interventionist strategies (South Korea), as well as 
non- interventionist one (Hong Kong and Thailand); explicitly redistributive policies 
(Malaysia), as well as distributionally neutral ones (most of the rest); clientelism 
(Indonesia and Thailand), as well as strong, autonomous states (South Korea, 
Singapore); emphasis on large conglomerates (South Korea), as well as on small, 
entrepreneurial firms (Taiwan). This range of strategies, all followed more or less 
successfully, suggests that the search for a single and simple explanation of the Asian 
miracle may well be futile. Six key areas that are associated with rapid growth across 
all countries, and in which East and Southeast Asia differed from other countries; 




- Manufactured Exports:  
 
One of the lessons of recent history is that even very poor countries without an 
abundance of skilled labor can achieve international competitiveness in manufactures. 
Malaysia was able to build up an electronics sector in the early 1970s almost from 
scratch, because US manufacturers moved the labor- intensive parts of their 
production process there. Even though Malaysia could not design or produce 
computer chips, it was able to assemble and test them, both labor- intensive 
operations. When Intel invested in Malaysia in 1972, the country was quickly brought 
into a world- class production system that drew on its comparative advantage. 
 
The critical element in manufactured exports is the linkages between domestic firms, 
their foreign affiliates, and global markets. In East Asia, these linkages took different 
forms. Foreign direct investment (FDI) was the primary connection for Hong Kong 
and Singapore. However, FDI initially played a limited role in South Korea that 
prohibited some types of foreign investment until the 1980s. It chooses instead to 
import technology under licensing agreements. Southeast Asian countries especially 
Indonesia and Thailand, also limited foreign investment in manufacturing (although 
they were more welcoming in minerals) until the 1980s or even the 1990s.  
 
The growth of manufactured exports in East Asian countries cannot be reasonably 
portrayed as the product of generalized free and open markets. Only Hong Kong, with 
perhaps the most open market in the world, can be classified as a laissez- faire 
economy. Singapore is in many respects also a very open economy, but it still has 
significant state involvement and ownership. By some measures, price distortions in 
Taiwan and South Korea were larger than the average for all developing countries. 
Wade (1990) and others have shown that import tariffs and quotas were neither very 
low nor uniform in South Korea. Most governments directed subsidized credit 
towards chosen industries, and all of the East Asian countries (except Hong Kong and 
Singapore) pursued textbook- style import substitution for some sectors. 
 
The main point here is that free markets were not always at the core of Asia’s success- 
except when it came to exporters competing on world markets. The common element 
between the open markets of Hong Kong and Singapore, the more interventionist 
states of Taiwan and South Korea, and the natural resource abundant, more state 
centered economies of Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand were their orientation 
toward world markets and their overriding goal of expanding exports of 
manufacturers. 
 
East Asian countries have kept import tariffs relatively low, and especially low- often 
zero- for intermediate and capital goods used by exporters. They have also limited the 
use of quantitative restrictions on such imports. Hong Kong, South Korea, and 
Singapore imposed almost no restrictions on imports of capital goods and raw 
materials. 
 
Other elements of open and flexible markets for exporters were just as important. For 
example, the successful East Asian exporters allowed free entry and exit of firms into 
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export manufacturing activities and imposed relatively low taxes. Hong Kong 
embraced these ideals most fully, with perhaps the most open markets in the world. 
Singapore also established open and flexible factor and output markets. Other East 
Asian countries, by different means, established conditions resembling free and open 
international trade, at least for exporters. 
 
So the key ingredient of the East Asian economies’ successful development strategy 
was their export orientation. Although each of these economies, other than Hong 
Kong, went through an initial import substitution phase, they subsequently promoted 
exports while, in most cases, continuing to protect domestic industries from import 
competition. The exports and imports of all these economies grew even faster than 
their output. In large part, manufactured exports- initially labor- intensive 
manufactures then high- technology exports such as machinery and equipment have 
led the export drive. 
 
Exports have been regarded as vital to the East Asian growth strategy, for several 
reasons. First, exports provided demand needed to sustain the growth process. For the 
most part these countries had relatively small internal markets- small populations or 
low per capita incomes at the initial stages of development. Therefore, rapid growth 
required external markets. Second, producing for export markets encouraged 
efficiency because domestic firms had to compete internationally. This was 
particularly important because East Asian governments had often discouraged 
domestic competition in order to enhance corporate earnings and saving, protect 
infant industries from foreign competition so as to develop new areas, particularly in 
manufacturing, and stimulate rapid growth so that firms would achieve economies of 
scale. Furthermore, as part of their export promotion strategies, East Asian 
governments encouraged the transfer of technology by fostering licensing for 
knowledge- intensive or technology- intensive products. Third, export promotion 
reinforced both the need for, and the ability to maintain, macroeconomic stability. On 
the one hand, East Asian governments generally sought to sustain competitive 
exchange rates to foster exports. Maintaining fiscal and monetary stability was 
important, therefore, to prevent real currency appreciation and exchange rate 
instability. On the other hand, export growth helped to resolve the potential conflict 
between rapid economic growth and the external financing constraint by helping to 
avoid the emergence of large current account deficits. In addition, as exports rose and 
generated income they contributed to government revenues and the government’s 
ability to maintain fiscal balance, in a virtuous circle. 
 
Many government policies assisted the export drive. Thus, despite high effective rates 
of protection, exporters had access to imports at close to world prices through a 
variety of channels, including free trade zones, export- processing zones, duty 
drawbacks, and tariff exemptions. In fact, comparisons of international and domestic 
price levels and their variability show significantly smaller price distortions in the 
East Asian economies than in other developing countries. Also, East Asian 
governments typically provided preferential financing and tax incentives for exports, 
subsidized export- marketing efforts and export- related infrastructure, promoted the 
creation of international trading companies. The export drive was also abetted by the 
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availability of external markets, particularly in Japan and the United States, but also 
increasingly within the Asian region.  
 
Exporting stimulated and supported strong learning in two ways. First, being forced to 
compete in world markets made the managers and engineers in the firms pay close 
attention to world standards. Second, much of the exporting involved contracting with 
American or Japanese firms who both demanded high performance and provided 
assistance to achieve it. 
 
Expanding interregional trade also played a critical role. A large part of this trade 
consisted of trade in intermediate goods, allowing the East Asian economies to 
generate economies of scale. The increased regional trade integration has undoubtedly 
been a positive element in the region’s economic development.  
  
- Industrial Policies: 
 
South Korea and Taiwan intervened heavily to promote specific import- substituting 
industries. Effective rates of protection in South Korea, while moderate on average, 
were highly dispersed. South Korea controlled both the allocation of credit and the 
interest rate through its state- owned banking system. The largest conglomerates, or 
chaebol, had access to subsidized credit, while smaller firms were forced to borrow in 
informal markets at much higher rates (Roemer, 1994). The government leaned 
heavily on the chaebol to meet export targets, and during the 1970s, to invest in infant 
heavy industries. Taiwan also directed credit towards favored industries, although 
they used subsidized credit less extensively. 
 
Import protection and directed credit in support of heavy industry clearly were not 
central to the success of Hong Kong, Singapore, Thailand, Indonesia and Malaysia. 
Hong Kong, of course, is probably the most open market in the world, and state 
intervention played little direct role in its industrial development (indirectly, the 
government’s main role in industrial policy was probably the promotion of effective 
infrastructure facilities). Singapore’s industrial policy was always aimed at promoting 
export industries, at first in labor- intensive sectors and later in more skill- based 
manufactures and services, but always consistent with its comparative advantage. 
Singapore used tax incentives as its policy of choice, and stayed clear of using 
protectionist trade policies (except for a brief period of mild import substitution in the 
early 1960s) and never used subsidized credit. It also established several extremely 
well run enterprises to support its export industries. 
 
- Resource Mobilization: 
 
Human capital formation advanced at a rapid pace, both quantitatively and 
qualitatively, in almost all the fast growing Asian countries. As early as 1965, primary 
school enrollment rates were already higher in this region than in many other 
developing countries. Hong Kong, South Korea and Singapore had achieved universal 
primary education, and even Indonesia- a populous nation and, at the time one of the 
poorest developing countries- had a primary school enrollment rate of over 70 
percent. These countries had what we call “education fever” where women played a 
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key role in maintaining this fever, for example in South Korea, mothers sold their hair 
to factories that exported wigs to pay for their children’s education. In the past four 
decades further significant progress was achieved, except in Thailand. Not only 
enrollment rates, but also the quality of education improved significantly during the 
last four decades in most of the these Asian economies, as average education 
expenditures per pupil rose and pupil- teacher ratios were reduced. By raising the skill 
level of the workforce, education and training contribute directly to the expansion of 
an economy’s productive capacity and growth potential. Human capital accumulation, 
however, also affects economic growth in indirect ways. Physical capital equipment 
and skill levels are often complementary, so that an increased availability of skilled 
labor may induce greater investment; conversely, as is the case in a number of 
developing countries, a paucity of skilled labor may deter certain types of investment. 
Moreover, Borensztein (1998) indicates that, although foreign direct investment is an 
important vehicle for the transfer of technology to developing countries, the 
productivity of foreign direct investment is higher than that of domestic investment 
only when the host economy has a minimum of human capital. 
 
Asian countries began their takeoff to rapid growth with an edge over many other 
developing countries in human capital and maintained that edge through explicit 
policies of investment in education. But critical to their superior growth performance 
was their ability to supply their workforces consistently with rapidly increasing 
amounts of physical capital. In Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia and Thailand, gross 
fixed investment as a proportion of GDP rose steadily and markedly over the past four 
decades, to above 30 percent in the first case and close to 40 percent in the other 
three. The main exceptions are Hong Kong and Taiwan where investment was a fairly 
stable share of GDP throughout, close to one- fourth. Despite its lower rate of capital 
accumulation, Taiwan’s growth performance has been as good as those of other Asian 
countries. 
 
Counterparts to the rapidly rising investment rates were, of course, rapidly rising 
saving rates and inflows of foreign capital. Several factors contributed to the rapid rise 
in domestic saving. Perhaps most important was the rapid pace of economic growth, 
which, by raising income levels above subsistence, led to higher aggregate saving 
rates. Rapid growth may have helped to raise overall saving also by increasing the 
incomes of the working young at a disproportionately fast rate. The region’s 
demographics, in particular its relatively low dependency ratios were also conducive 
to high saving rates. The fruits of favorable economic policies- including a stable 
macroeconomic environment, especially low rates of inflation, positive real interest 
rates, and a fast pace of financial deepening- are also likely to have had a strong 
positive influence on saving rates. 
 
- Macroeconomic Stability: 
 
Unlike many other developing countries that experienced numerous boom- bust 
cycles during the past four decades, the fast- growing Asian economies generally 
maintained a relatively high degree of macroeconomic stability. In some economies 
(for instance South Korea, Malaysia, and Singapore) strong political support for anti- 
inflationary policies acted as a constraint on fiscal policies. Also, in Hong Kong, the 
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currency board arrangement in place since 1983 has disciplined fiscal policy as well 
as constraining monetary action. Disciplined macroeconomic policies provided a 
stable environment for private sector decision making and contributed to the high 
rates of saving, domestic and foreign investment, and export growth that were 
ingredients in the region’s growth performance. 
 
Macroeconomic stability was especially challenging for the resource rich countries of 
Southeast Asia, which had to maintain stability through several commodity boom and 
bust cycles. 
 
- Economic Management: 
 
To implement their development strategies, the successful Asian economies 
consistently placed well- trained, able economic technicians in charge of 
macroeconomic management. These technicians were given wide latitude in setting 
economic policy. For example, president Park of South Korea invariably shielded the 
Economic Planning Board (EPB) from political pressures and kept the military from 
having undue influence on economic policy, as did President Suharto in Indonesia. 
Thailand’s popular and revered monarchy protected senior economic policy- makers, 
despite frequent military coups and changes in the prime minister.  
 
In at least some of the more successful countries, policy implementation was aided a 
competent civil service. Singapore separated the civil service from the political party, 
and based promotions on competence rather than longevity. Similarly, South Korea 
bases hiring and promotion decisions on examinations and on performance. South 
Korea upgraded the quality of economic analysis available to its policy- makers by 
establishing the Korea Development Institute in 1971, which could attract well- 
qualified technicians without directly hiring them into the civil service. Civil servants 
are generally well paid, especially in Singapore, both to enable the government to 




Sustained political stability in Asian countries enabled governments to be consistent 
in their approach and to implement longer- term economic strategies (Lindauer and 
Roemer, 1994). Almost all of the successful Asian economies had stable political 
leadership, with few changes in heads of state and little shift in underlying economic 
direction. President Park led South Korea for 18 years, President Suharto has ruled 
Indonesia for nearly three decades, and Lee Kuan Yew presided over Singapore’s 
development for over a quarter of a century. Thailand’s frequent changes in prime 
ministers make it an exception, but even there, economic policy makers remained in 
their positions even when prime ministers changed, providing constancy to economic 
policy. 
 
Of course, stable political leadership is far from sufficient to engender sustained 
economic development, look at many countries in Africa with long- lived 




Asia’s successful governments can be differentiated from other long- standing 
governments by their ideas about and strategies for sustained economic development. 
Governments must have an approach for economic management and development that 
can be implemented and that will ultimately succeed in achieving long- term 
economic growth. During the past several decades, many perhaps well- meaning 
governments followed misguided development paradigms: extensive central planning 
with non- market allocation (in East Europe and the former Soviet Union for 
instance), long- term and widespread import substitution (throughout Latin America), 
or the extraction of resources from the agricultural sector to support urban industry (in 
many African countries).  
 
These Asian leaders were strongly committed to their strategy of stimulating exports 
and supporting rapid economic growth. In one famous example, President Park 
personally presided over monthly export meetings attended by senior government 
officials and business leaders, and continuously put a high priority on achieving 
annual export targets.  
 
Lee Kuan Yew was in many ways Singapore’s chief salesman, never tiring of 
expounding on the attractiveness of Singapore as a destination for foreign investment. 
  
Perkins and Roemer (1994) and others have argued that economic policy- makers and 
government leaders in some Asian countries may have put an unusually high premium 
on rapid economic growth because they saw it as essential to the survival of their 
regimes. In the 1950s and early 1960s, many observers questioned whether such small 
and unstable countries as South Korea and Singapore could survive in the face of 
external threats. Failure to grow rapidly and distribute the gains relatively equitably 
might have doomed these governments, or even the existence of these nations.  
 
The above-mentioned key areas are the key to understanding rapid growth in East and 
Southeast Asia, and slower growth elsewhere. 
 
3. Key Messages 
 
- Reform must begin with the government: 
 
Any reform undertaken must begin with the government, because without making the 
necessary changes in the government, reform of the targeted segment will surely fail 
and the progress toward democracy and a market economy is likely to stall. The 
determination to reinvent the government stems from the realization of the need to 
establish a firm foundation upon which to rebuild the economy. To start anew as a 
government that sets an example for other sectors of the society to follow as well as a 
government that truly serves the public, government reform should be implemented 
with utmost priority. 
 
To achieve this end, the most urgent step to be taken is to introduce fair and 
competitive free market forces to the government sector. To maximize private sector 
autonomy and initiative, government intervention and regulation should be sharply 
reduced, superfluous government functions should be abolished, reduced, or 
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transferred to the private sector. At the same time, the government’s role in protecting 
the weak, establishing a social safety net, market supervision and environmental 
protection, among others, should be substantially strengthened.   
 
- Reforms are not one- time actions: 
 
This long and complex process includes negotiating with stakeholders, overcoming 
resistance, consensus- building and institutionalizing a new system. For successful 
implementation, the country needs a strong champion group not only in the 
government, but also in the private sector. The champion group should help the 
parties involved to reach a consensus, support implementation, monitor reform 
processes, and quickly deliver feedback on it. The government needs to take a more 
active role in monitoring the overall progress of implementation and adjusting the 
reform track to fit the goal. 
 
For the government to play a greater role as an intermediary of conflict resolution, it 
is essential to secure public’s confidence in the role of government. To this end, the 
government should be able to demonstrate that it pursues a coherent and transparent 
rule of law. Only when there is an institutional mechanism that can objectively 
demonstrate that the government is playing the role of an intermediary based on law, 
will the government be able to regain confidence from the public. 
 
For social consensus to be reached autonomously, corresponding social values should 
be formed and evaluated. For example, in case attempts to reconcile conflicts fail, the 
government should not be expected to shoulder all the responsibilities. It is important 
to recognize and have trust in government intervention when deemed recessing. As 
unofficial intermediaries, the press and expert groups should feel responsible for the 
opinions they form. They need to approach conflict resolution from a practical stance, 
not to appear good. Criticism without alternatives only results in time and energy- 
consuming disputes. Therefore, the press and expert groups should foster the ability to 
build consensus and self- discipline. 
 
- Maintaining consistency is a crucial factor for success: 
 
In building a national leadership in any country, leader’s consistency between words 
and actions is the most important factor for winning trust and credibility of general 
public. In this respect, keeping a strict system of reward and penalty is critical to 
gaining people’s support to reform. If people see the cases in which those for penalty 
had been rewarded greatly and vice versa, the government’s credibility might be 
greatly damaged. 
 
- Introducing new systems for reform doesn’t matter much; what matters 
is how to implement them and how to make them deep- rooted: 
 
It is rather easy to copy new systems from other countries and introduce them. But it 
is very much difficult to implement them and make them deep- rooted in quite 
different environment. In order to have successful reform, it is impossible to overstate 
the importance of “after- management” of reform, which could make new systems 
 
11
deep- rooted in the public sector. So, for the aspect of timing strategy, the later half of 
the regime’s tenure should be concentrated on “after- management” rather than on 
introduction of new fancy systems, if any. 
 
- Reformers should be well aware of true nature of reform process: 
 
In many cases, reform is much more difficult than revolution. Machiavelli once told, 
“The innovator makes enemies of all those who prospered under the old order, and 
only lukewarm support is forthcoming from those who would prosper under the new”. 
He is warning that reformers should be ready for harsh realities and so should have a 
firm and cool resolution and determination.  
 
- Reforming culture is more important and takes more time than reforming 
system: 
 
Reforming culture is important; but it takes time. We should be patient and have a 
long- term perspective. Reform takes time. Reform is, in a sense, not a destination; it 
is a journey, though not pleasant and comfortable. In this regard, we should pay more 
attention to the importance of human capital investment for future leaders and 
reformers. We should make substantial investments of our time and money for 
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